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Abstract
This paper investigates the risks and vulnerabilities associated to the security of the WiMAX/802.16 broadband
wireless technology. One of the other aspects of this document will be to review all the associated weaknesses to the
Medium Access Control (MAC) layer and at the physical (PHY) layer. The risks and impacts are assessed according
to a systematic approach. The approach or methodology is used is according to the European Telecommunication
Standards Institute (ETSI). These threats are enumerated and classified accordingly to their risk levels.
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INTRODUCTION
In the modern era, high volume and open standard radio technology (802.11, 802.16, 802.30, WiFi, WiMAX and
future standards) offer exceptional benefits to network operators and users.
The 802.16 standard amended January 2006 by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) covers
frequency bands in the range of 2 GHz and 11 GHz compared to the previous parameters of 10 GHz to 66 GHZ. The
amended standard specified a metropolitan area networking (MAN) protocol that enhances and enables an alternative
for cable, DSL, T1. The new 802.16a standard specifies a convention that establishes low latency application, such as
voice and video. This protocol provides connectivity without having access to a direct lineofsight (LOS) between
subscribers and base station (BS).
This document defines wireless access technology being in association with WiMAX with respect to all the other
wireless technologies such as IPbased mobile and wireless access.
According to the IEEE Communication Magazine (2002), the IEEE Standard 802.16 completed in the late 2001 and
published on April 2002 defines on air interface requirement for the wireless networks. Air interface for fixed point
tomultipoint (P2MP) was possible by the completion of this specific standard. The IEEE 802.16 offers an alternative
to cabled access networks, such in the instance of fiber optic, coaxial systems and digital subscriber line (DSL).
The IEEE Communication Magazine (2002), initially the LOS transmission was between the range of 10 GHz and 66
GHz but following two published amendments, namely IEEE 802.16c which defines profiles of typical
implementations, and IEEE 802.16a, which consists of managed improvement and the development of a mesh mode.
It also allowed capacity to carry additional frequencies. These subsequent amendments then enabled transmission in
the range of 2 GHz to 11 GHz on a non lineofsight (NLOS) transmission for both licensed and unlicensed services.
One of the major revisions was published in 2004 as IEEE 802.16d compiling and enhancing both IEEE 802.16a and
IEEE 802.16c. This defined the added mechanism to maintain mobile subscribers at vehicular pace and also for data
validation.

This document presents an in depth scrutiny of the spectrum of the security threats to the WiMAX/802.16. The aim
of this paper is to reflect the most recent threats to the wireless access systems. All the vulnerabilities are assessed
with respect to the probability of it happening, the resultant effect together with the actual feasible impact on
individual users and the system, and the overall weakness it represents.

METHODOLOGY
To analyze the different threats planning around the IEEE Standard 802.16, a structured methodological approach
needs to be considered in order to test and evaluate the probability of occurrences to happen, the impacts associated
to those occurrences and finally, the risks involved. The best approach in conducting this measure is to adopt the
European Telecommunication Standard Institute (ETSI). It is noted that the analysis is carried out according to the
ETSI version 2003. Table 1 illustrates a clear summary of this methodology.
Table 1: Risk Assessment (WiMAX/802.16 Threat Analysis, 2005)
CRITERIA
Probability

CRITERIA

Impact

Risk

CASES

DIFFICULTY

MOTIVATION

RANK

Unlikely

Strong

Low

1

Possible

Solvable

Reasonable

2

Likely

None

High

3

CASES

USER

SYSTEM

RANK

Low

Annoyance

Very Limited Outages

1

Medium

Loss of Service

Limited Outages

2

High

Loss of Service

Long time Outages

3

Minor

No Need for Countermeasure

1, 2

Major

Threat Needs to be Handled

3, 4

Critical

High Priority

6, 9

Referring to the table above, the assessment is carried out according three factors; probability, impact, and the risks
involved.
The probability evaluates the likeliness that attacks are associated to the threats conducted. When considering the
probability of attacks to occur, the two factors to consider are:
1.

The technical difficulties that need to be resolved by an attacker and,

2.

The motivation for accomplishing it’s attack

When the probability of attack is ‘Low’ there are either multiple technical barriers to overcome with unidentified
uncertainties, and/or there is a low motivation factor for accomplishing an attack of that category.
The probability can be ‘Possible’ only if there are defined technical difficulties but manageable due to the
availability of the necessary information, or if there are practical reasons for the hacker to construct then lead the
attack.
A ‘Likely’ probability is to occur when there are no technical barriers to overcome thus providing the attacker with a
high motivation to engage in an attack.

The impact factor analyzes and indicates the effects of an attack which is related to the threat. Depending on the
severity of the attack, the impact may be classified as Low, Medium or High.
The impact is defined as ‘Low’ where there are reversible or repairable actions, the service disruption is short or the
number of users affected a minimal.
A ‘Medium’ impact can affect only one user and have a consequential loss of usage over a period of time. In relation
to the system, the impact is medium when the outage is restrained. A medium impact may cause limited financial
setback.
When the loss of system usage is over a considerable length of time to a single user, defined as long to the
organization, the impact is ‘High’. A long outage of the system is high also. There may be numerous users unable to
access the system, severe financial loss and/or illegal offences.
To enable objective analysis of the probability and the impact of the threat, the different categories as defined above
can be numerically graded. When multiplying the grade of the probability and the impact level, the result is the valid
risk. Any risk value of one or two is a minor threat with no real contingency planning required. Any risk valued as
three of four is major and requires plans for business continuity. A risk to the value of six or greater is critical and
immediate countermeasures are to be prioritized. Using the ETSI methodology as outlined above is impartial and
nonbiased. It is an objective approach to prioritize the preventative remedies.

ANALYSIS
A WiMAX/802.16 wireless access network consists of base stations (BS) and of mobile stations (MS). The MSs are
networked by the BSs by searching for the strongest BS signal to attach to. A subscriber is a system user, while the
BS and multiple MSs are the system.
The structure of WiMAX/806.12 consists of two core tiers, the Medium Access Control (MAC) and the Physical
Layer (PHY). There are Service Access Points (SAPs) defined at different levels of the WiMAX architecture. MAC
Protocol Data Units (PDUs) are formed in the Common Part sublayer which is at the central core of the system. After
being assembled, the connections of MAC PDUs are created and bandwidth is administered. MAC Service Data
Units (SDUs) are interchanged with the Convergence Layer enabled in the Common Part. The Security sublayer is
firmly incorporated with the Common Part. The Security sublayer role is to authenticate and establish keys and
encryption. MAC PDUs must be verified by the Security layer to enable successful exchange with the Physical Layer.
Higher level protocol data units are transformed to and from the MAC SDU format at the Convergence Layer, which
also directs the MAC SDUs to the appropriate connection. The Physical Layer has a dual direction mapping function
between the MAC PDU and Physical layer RF transmissions.
Security threats at the Physical and MAC layers are investigated of which Table 3 illustrates the threat risk to user
and system respectively (when there are two values listed) or indicating the same value for both (when there is only
one value).

WIMAX & THE PHYSICAL LAYER
The first version of the 802.16 standard has a physical layer (PHY) specification for 10 to 66 GHz addressing LOS
environment at high frequency bands, whereas the amendment version of 802.16a has been designed for systems
operating on bands between 2 to 11 GHz. One of the major advantages of this difference between the two frequencies
is that the latter allows and support NLOS operation in low frequencies, something that is not possible in higher
bands. This has been made possible through the introduction of three new PHY layer specifications:
1.

Single Carrier Modulation format.

2.

256 point Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM) format.

3.

2048 point Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA). The OFDMA allows multiple
accesses by acknowledging a subset of the multiple carriers to an individual receiver.

The table below (Table 2) illustrates a list of all the features and the benefits of the physical layer 802.16a

PHYSICAL LAYER DETAILS
According to IEEE Communications Magazine (2002), the PHY attribute defined for 10 to 66 GHz uses burst single
carrier modulation with adaptive burst profiling that may be adjusted to the subscriber station (SS) separately each
frame one at a time. At the physical layer, the flow of bits is organized as a sequence of frames of equal length.
The physical layer consists of a downlink subframe and an uplink frame and two modes of operation:
a)

Frequency Division Duplex (FDD)

b) Time Division Duplex (TDD)
Table 2 Features and benefits of the 802.16 of Physical Layer (PHY) features. (Worldwide Interoperability for
Microware Access Forum, n.d)
FEATURES

BENEFITS

256 point ODFM

Built in support for addressing multipath in outdoor LOS &
NLOS environment

Adaptive Modulation and variable
connection encoding per RF burst
TDD & FDD duplexing support
Flexible Channel Sizes
(eg 3.5, 5, 10 MHz)
Designed to support smart antenna system

error

Ensure a robust RF link maximizing the number of lists for
each subscriber unit
Address varying worldwide regulation where one or both
may be allowed
Provides the flexibility necessary to operate in many
frequency bands with ranging channel requirement around
the world
Smart antenna system are becoming more affordable and as
those costs come down their ability to suppress interference
and increase system gain will become important to Band
Wireless Access (BWA)

ReedSolomon GF(256) is the type of Forward Error Correction (FEC) used which has a variable block size and
error fixing capabilities stated by the IEEE Communication Magazine (2002). Coupled with an inner block
convolution code, the FEC steadily broadcast crucial information such as frame control and initial access.
The FEC solutions are integrated with Quadrature Phase Shift Keying (QPSK), 16state Quadrature Amplitude
Modulation (16QAM) and 64state QAM (64QAM) to configure burst profiles of different strength and
effectiveness. However, when the last FEC block is left empty, that block can be truncated. When truncating occurs,
both the downlink and the uplink which is managed by the BS is exclusively broadcast to the downlink map (DL
MAP) and to the uplink map (ULMAP) as shown in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Detailed downlink subframe structure.(IEEE Communication Magazine, 2002)
The system operates a frame of 0.5, 1 or 2 ms which is separated into physical slots for the aim of both bandwidth
identification and allocation. A physical slot is characterized as a 4 QAM symbol.
In the FDD variant, the uplink and downlink subframe are timed simultaneously but transmitted on different
frequencies whereas in the TDD variant of the physical later, the uplink subframe follows the downlink subframe on
the same carrier frequency as shown in the figure below.

Figure 2. Framing of both TDD and FDD .(WiMAX/802.16 Threat Analysis, 2005)
A comprehensive illustration of a TDD downlink subframe which is defined in figure 3 denotes the burst
characteristic of the transmission. There are two main parts to a downlink subframe. The first part holds the frame
control section that contains the DLMAP for the current downlink frame as well as the ULMAP for a specified
time while the second part contains the data. In addition, this section also contains control information consisting of
preamble, being the frame synchronization purpose. The downlink map reveals the commencement point and
transmission features of data burst whereas the uplink map reveals the allotment of the bandwidth to the MS for the
transmission. Each burst is sent in reference to a profile of modulation and a type of FEC which is sent in an

expanding flow of demodulation frequency. Therefore the MS can only accept the bursts while it has the competency
of doing so and rejects those that cannot be demodulated.

Figure 3. Detailed Time Division Duplex (TDD) downlink subframe. .(WiMAX/802.16 Threat Analysis, 2005)

PHYSICAL LAYER THREATS
The security sublayer is positioned just above the physical layer enabling it to be unsecured as shown in Figure 4.
Jamming and scrambling can be the form of attack to the PHY as the WiMAX 802.16 is defenseless. Jamming is an
interruption of the frequency such as intense noise. It can either be intended or accidental. Resistance to jamming
can be increased by raising the signal frequency or intensifying the bandwidth using precise spreading techniques
e.g. sequence spread spectrum and frequency hopping. Increasing the power of the signal can be achieved easily by
means of using a more powerful transmitter or a high gain transmission antenna and a high gain receiving antenna.
Scrambling is similar to jamming but this happens at small time period and is focused to certain frames or parts of
frames. Scramblers can intently effect control or management information with the rationale of disturbing the
networks normal operation. This is of grave concern for time sensitive messages which do not have builtin time
delay. Examples of this are channel measurement reports requests or responses. Intentional scrambling of data traffic
of particular users can cause them to retransmit. Though intended scrambling is more complex than jamming, the
probability for scrambling to occur is possible due to natural noise interruption and the availability periods of the
attack. These attacks can be unveiled by analyzing discrepancies in the systems performance.
MAC
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Figure 4. WiMAX 802.16 Layered Architecture .(WiMAX/802.16 Threat Analysis, 2005)
The risk of scrambling is low in comparison to jamming because the attacker has to interpret control information and
involves sending noise over the network at specific time interval. The impact of scrambling is low nevertheless
results are reversible for example, by retransmission. Jamming is easier to detect, in comparison to scrambling, with
the use of a radio spectrum monitoring equipment. The risks associated with jamming are actually quite high as
shown in Table 4.

MEDIUM ACCESS CONTROL (MAC) LAYER DETAILS

The Medium Access Control (MAC) normally embeds a service-specific convergence sublayer that interacts to
higher levels above the core MAC common part sublayer that includes the key MAC function. The privacy sublayer
sits under the common part sublayer.
SERVICE-SPECIFIC CONVERGENCE LAYER
IEEE Standard 802.16 describes two common servicespecific convergence sublayers for mapping services to and
from the 802.16 MAC connections. The Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) convergence layer is dedicated to ATM
facilities whereas the packet convergence layer is accountable for mapping conventions and protocols. The crucial
role of the sublayer is to organize Service Data Units (SDUs) to the accurate MAC connection, to facilitate and
provide Quality of Service (QoS), and to establish bandwidth allocation. As well as these basic functions, the
convergence sublayer also has the ability to achieve highly intricate tasks such as the reconstruction and suppression
payload header to boost airlink performance.
COMMON PART SUBLAYER DETAILS
The 802.16 MAC is set up to sustain a P2MP framework with a central BS managing several independent sectors
simultaneously. On the downlink, data to SS, are normally multiplexed in TDM way and for the uplink is shared
between the SS are multiplexed in TDMA way.
Given that the 802.16 MAC is connection oriented, it provides a vehicle for requesting bandwidth association of QoS
and traffic limits, routing and sending information to the correct convergence sublayer. The connection used is
usually fixed with a 16bit connection identifier (CID).
Table 3 demonstrates the features and benefits of the 802.16 of MAC Layer. (Worldwide Interoperability for
Microware Access Forum, n.d)
FEATURES

BENEFITS

TDM / TDMA Scheduled Downlink/Uplink frames

Efficient bandwidth usage

Scalable from 1 to 100 of subscribers

Allows cost effective deployments by supporting
enough subs to deliver robust business case.

Connection-oriented
QoS supportContinuous GrantReal Time Variable Bit
RateNon Real Time Variable Bit RateBest Effort
Automatic Retransmission request (ARQ)

1) Per Connection QoS
2) Faster packet routing and forwarding
1) Low latency for delay sensitive services (TDM
Voice, VoIP)
2) Optimal transport for VBR traffic(e.g., video)·
Improves end-to-end performance by hiding RF
layer induced errors from upper layer protocols

Support for adaptive modulation

Enables highest data rates allowed by channel
conditions, improving system capacity

Security and encryption (Triple DES)

Protects user privacy

Automatic Power control

Enables cellular deployments by minimizing self
interference

Each SS has a typical 48bit MAC address which purpose is to primarily identify the equipment of which the
primary addresses used in the system are the CIDs. On joining to the network the SS is allocated three separate
management connections reflecting the three different QoS level. These are:
1.

Basic Connection
Basic connection is used for the transmission of short timecritical MAC and radiolink control (RLC)
messages.

2.

Primary Management Connection
Primary management connection transmits longer and more delaytolerant communication such as the one
used in verification, validation and set of connections.

3.

Secondary Management Connection
Secondary connection management is used for the transfer of standardsbase management messages.
Examples of such are Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
and the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).

Transport connections are conveyed only in one direction to ease the QoS of both downlink and uplink subframes
and traffic parameters which are normally paired.
MAC PDU FORMATS
The MAC PDU is the data unit transferred between the MAC layers of the BS and it SSs. It consists of a fixed length
MAC header, a variablelength payload and an optional cyclic redundancy check (CRC).

Figure 5. Format of a MAC PDU generic header. (IEEE Communications Magazine, 2002)
Apart from the bandwidth request an important aspect of the MAC PDU is that no payload exists but contains the
MAC convergence sublayer data or the management of messages.
There are three possible types of MAC Subheaders in the MAC PDU:

1.

Grant Management Subheaders: These SSs uses the Grant Management Subheader to deliver bandwidth
requirements to its BS.

2.

Fragmentation Subheaders: This is the section holding data notifying the existence and the direction in the
payload of any fragment of the SDUs.

3.

The Packing Subheaders: This section enables multiple SDUs to consolidate into a single PDU.

TRANSMISSION OF MAC PDUs
The IEEE 802.16 MAC layer sustains several highlayer data units such as IP and ATM. Inward bound MAC SDUs
are configured to the MAC PDU format at the Convergence layer. Fragmentation, the division of MAC SDUs, or/and
packing, the combining of single MAC PDUs into a single MAC PDU payload, before being transferred over a single
or multiple connections with regards to the MAC protocol may occur.
Both fragmenting and packing of the bandwidth allocation occurs to enhance the effectiveness, efficiently and the
feasibility of both. These processes can be activated by a downlink connection by the BS or an uplink connection by
the SS.
RADIO LINK CONTROL
The highly sophisticated technology of the 802.16 PHY demands that burst profile transmissions occur via an
advanced Radio Link Control (RLC), whilst continuing to function traditionally i.e. power control and ranging. The
RLC operates by broadcasting at regular intervals, the burst profiles chosen for the uplink and downlink of the BS.
Factors such as rain region and equipment capabilities affect which burst profiles are used on a channel. Downlink
bust profiles are tagged with a Downlink Interval Usage Code (DIUC) and the uplink are tagged with an Uplink
Interval Usage Code (UIUC).
During the first connection, the SS complete initial power handling and varying using ranging request (RNGREQ)
messages transmitted in maintenance windows. The SS also request to be served in the downlink through a particular
burst profile by transmitting its choice of DIUC to the BS.
CHANNEL ACQUISITION
Manual configuration is not required to find the operating channel as the MAC protocol includes an automatic
initialization procedure. Once installed, the SS begins scanning its frequency. It can sometimes already be
programmed to link with an identified BS. This programming is particularly beneficial in dense environments where
the SS might not be able to easily distinguish the target BS if a secondary BS antenna is in close proximity or due to
selective.
After selecting the channel(s) to endeavor data exchange, the SS attempts to synchronize to the downlink
transmission by locating the intermittent frame preambles. Once the physical layer is synchronized, the SS searches
for the frequently broadcast DCD or UCD message that facilitates the SS to learn the modulation of the FEC
schemes used on the carrier.
SS AUTHENTICATION & REGISTRATION
Each SS includes an X.509 digital certificate which is manufacturerissued and factoryinstalled as well as the
manufacturer’s certificate. The connection of the 48bit MAC address of the SS and its RSA key is permitted due to
the SS sending Authorization Request and Authorization Information messages to the BS seeking verification of the
certificates. At this stage the network also identifies the SSs authorization permissions. To complete network
approval of the SS, the BS replies to the request with an Authorization Reply carrying an Authorization Key (AK)
encrypted with the SSs public key.

Successful authorization allows the BS to secure all following communication during connection. A secondary
management connection of the SS is launched when network registration is completed. The registration process also
verifies connection setup ability, MAC operation capabilities and the IP version.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC METHODS
Before encryption, each packet number is allocated a distinctive numeric character as a new 4byte packet number.
The 802.16e applies Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode and the Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) in the CCM to encrypt the payload of the MAC PDU.

MAC LAYER THREATS
Table 4 lists the values of eavesdropping, an undetected listener of the communication, for management messages
and user traffic separately. Eavesdropping mostly affects the transfer of information and rarely causes system outage.
The assessment of the eavesdropping threat is minor to the system but high for the user. Countermeasures for minor
threats are not required.
Table 4 point up a summary of the threats
THREAT

ALGORITHM USED

Jamming
Scrambling
Eavesdropping Management
Message
Eavesdropping Traffic
BS or MS Masquerading
Management
Modification

Message

THREAT
Data Traffic Modification
DOS on BS or MS

DES – CBC
AES – CCM
Device List
X.509 certificate-based
EAP
NO MAC
SHA –1 MAC
AES MAC
ALGORITHM USED
Without AES
With AES
EAP, SHA –1, AES, MAC

PROBABILITY

IMPACT

RISK

3
2

1
1

3
2

3:3

2:1

6:3

3
2:1
2:2
3
2
1
PROBABILITY
3
1
3:3

3
3:2
3:2
3
3
3
IMPACT
1
1
3:2

9
6:2
6:4
9
6
3
RISK
3
1
9:6

The masquerading threat of the BS or Ms is enabled when authentication weaknesses are present. Identity theft and
Rogues BS are specific techniques of masquerading.
Identity theft takes place when the original hardware address is reprogrammed with the address of a different device.
This problem is widespread for unlicensed services such as WiFi/802.11, but has since been curbed with the release
of subsequent technology such as subscriber ID module (SIM) cards on cellular networks.
Another form of masquerading is when the original BS is being imitated by a rogue BS i.e. an external deceitful
maninthemiddle attacker. The MS’s are unable to differentiate between the legitimate BS and the rogue BS while
considering the type of network on which the attack is being conducted, which determines the method of attack.
On a WiFi/802.11 network which has carrier sense multiple access, the attacker attains the identity of the legal access
point (AP) then sends a message during idle time. The WiMAX/802.16 network is a time division multiple access
model meaning the attacker’s rogue BS transmission must arrive to the MS at the same time the legitimate BS
transmits but stronger to fade the signal of the genuine BS. Just as with the previously identity theft, the attacker

builds a message using the hardware address of the original BS. The attacker waits for the original BS to commence
transmission and sends the rogue message whilst acquiring a receive signal at higher decibels than the original BS.
The unsuspecting MS deciphers the signal of the rogue BS.
The advanced technology of WiMAX/802.16 has introduced the capability of mutual authentication. This occurs
after the network entry steps of scanning, acquisition of channel description, ranging and capability negotiation.
Mutual authentication is based on the generic Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). For WiMAX/802.16 EAP
can be achieved with exact authentication systems such as EAPTLS (X.509 certificatebased) or EAPSIM
according to B. Aboban and D. Simon (1999) and H. Haverinen and J. Salousy (2004) respectively. They also note
that three options of authentication are:
1.

Device listbased

2.

X.509 certificatebased

3.

EAPbased

The probability of a BS or MA masquerading attack is likely to occur when using only a device listbased with a
high impact, thus requiring countermeasures due to the high risk.
The X.509 certificatebased authentication limits the masquerading threat to a system but a high impact for the user
because loss of service can take place for a lengthy time period. The system impact is classified as medium as
possible financial loss, due to theft of air time, is limited. For a user the risk is critical and countermeasures are
essential but not for the system.
In the case of an EAPbased authentication being used, a BS or MS masquerading attack is possible. The impact of
the system is medium and high for the user classifying the risk as major for the system and critical for the user,
similar to the X.509 certificatebased authentication. With EAPbased authentication it is advisable to have a
secondary line for business continuity.
By the nature of how the system is designed, MAC management messages are not encrypted and sometimes not
validated. The possible authentication methods available are:
1) Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
2) Onekey Message Authentication Code (OMAC)
3) Unique to the OMAC method is that it is AESbased and has a feature where by the message has replay
protection.
The various types of attacks that are probable due to weaknesses in the MAC management system authentication can
be maninthemiddle (MITM) attack, replay attack, passive and active attacks. Either of these attacks is classified as
high as they affect the channels of communication. This is precisely the reason for suggesting that a second line of
defense is essential for the operations.
Authentication procedures are lengthy encouraging the potential for denial of service (DoS) attacks. This is a form of
attack which inundates the system with copious amounts of messages. The impact of this attack is classified as
medium to the system as only time is affected at that level, but can be high for the user as it causes delays in the
system responding to the individual’s requests.

CONCLUSION
The air interface as documented in the IEEE Standard 802.16 supports the development and operation of standard
based network environment. After evaluating the analysis carried out on the threats to the security of the
WiMAX/802.16 broadband wireless access network, it can be summarized that the most crucial threats include

eavesdropping of management messages, BS or MS masquerading, and appropriate consideration should be given to
the modification of management messages and denial of service attacks.
The obvious threats that are to be considered are jamming and data traffic modification when AES is not preferred.
An approach of securing the WiMAX/802.16 is to make use of a Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS) which
can help in addressing some of the issues. Yet, WiMAX/802.16 being a new field of wireless is bound to have more
research conducted on this technology.
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